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The First Lady
as Formal Advisor to the President:
When East (Wing) Meets West (Wing)
MaryAnne Borrelli, Connecticut College
ABSTRACT. Drawing on archival research, this article examines how
the position of the first lady has been formally defined, and how that def-
inition has affected presidential advising by first ladies. Three first la-
dies–Eleanor Roosevelt, Rosalynn Carter, and Hillary Rodham Clinton–
have served in a formal capacity within the executive branch. In each in-
stance, the first lady’s appointment, and subsequent exercise of formal
and informal power, carried significant implications for our understanding
of this position, the presidency, and the political system. [Article copies
available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-
HAWORTH. E-mail address: <getinfo@haworthpressinc.com> Website: <http://
www.HaworthPress.com> © 2002 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]
Political scientists and historians have long acknowledged the evolu-
tionary character of the first lady’s position. Rather than being created–or
even established–by a single actor or process, the post of the first lady is a
cultural tradition. It has evolved over time, reflecting the values of the
polity, the presidency, and the presidential family. But only studying the
evolutionary aspect of the office of first lady neglects an important aspect
of her position. In addition to her informal role, the first lady is a formal
member of the White House Office. Particularly during the latter part of
the twentieth century, there has been a legislative and judicial concern to
define this post and also this office. What has been the effect of statutory
and case law on the first ladies? Have the first ladies’ actions, as formal
and informal presidential advisors, been affected?
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In one administration after another, first ladies have made significant
political contributions. Surveying administrations from that of George
Washington to Bill Clinton, O’Connor, Nye, and van Assendelft (1996)
found that at least 31 first ladies discussed politics with the president, 26
were confidantes or advisors (“screening correspondence, highlighting
news articles, and editing speeches”), and 14 “influenced” the appoint-
ment process (846). Similarly, Barbara Burrell (1997a, 1997b) found that
first ladies have often been members of the presidents’ inner circles.
Given these roles, perhaps it is not surprising that there has also been an
ongoing concern about the accountability of these presidential advisors.
Though public opinion has historically checked first ladies, law has re-
cently become another means by which their actions have been reviewed
and their discretion has been limited.
Imposing legal constraints on a presidential advisor, however, is no
simple matter. Legislative involvement in White House consultations
and staffing raises questions about the proper separation of powers. Too
much legislative involvement may inhibit the president’s proper exercise
of Article II powers. Further, the fact that the first lady and president are
married raises privacy concerns. Yet first ladies have served as policy ad-
vocates, spokespersons, campaign surrogates, and presidential partners.
Consultations between first ladies and presidents are not merely pri-
vate–they are also politically substantive and, therefore, public. Some
have suggested that the first lady’s marital relationship with the president
gives her undue influence; this informal power leads some commentators
to conclude that the president’s wife should not engage in presidential
politics. As even this brief overview indicates, the formal definition of the
first lady’s position–the explicit grant of formal power and the equally
explicit statement of constraints on the exercise of that power–involves
the negotiation of competing visions of legislative-executive relations
and gender relations.
This article studies how these negotiations have proceeded. It docu-
ments first the emergent formal definition of the position and office of the
first lady. The associated legal developments have at once constrained
the first lady’s informal power and invested her with formal power. The
analysis then proceeds to consider how these laws have affected the first
lady’s performance of formal presidential advising. On the one hand, it
seems that the first lady’s post is so rooted in historical practices and per-
sonal relationships that it defies legal definition. Given the informal
power that is gained through their access to the chief executive, first la-
dies could circumvent legal constraints on their political activism. On the
other hand, law sets a standard for claims to authority and for the exercise
26 WOMEN & POLITICS
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of power in the United States. Federal officials are both constrained and
protected by the law, and there are few reasons why the first lady should
be a singular exception to this otherwise routine practice.
DESCRIBING THE FIRST LADYSHIP:
DEFINING THE POSITION
AND OFFICE OF THE FIRST LADY
To date, the dominant approaches taken in studying the first ladies
have been historical and biographical. Anthony (1991) and Caroli (1995)
are exemplars of this method of study. They address each first lady in a
distinct chapter, with the first ladies’ life stories framing the analysis.
Though themes run through the chapters and give coherence to the vol-
umes, the women are treated more as individuals than as successive occu-
pants of a White House position (see also Truman 1995).
This attentiveness to the first ladies as singular persons is evident even
in works that analyze the first lady’s more institutional roles. Gutin
(1989), for example, has conducted an excellent study of the rhetorical
style and content of the first ladies’ remarks and speeches. Even so, each
of her chapters focuses on a single first lady and begins with a biographi-
cal overview. Similarly, Troy (2000) profiles each first lady before exam-
ining her role in presidential image-making. That these authors presented
the first lady this way suggests the strength of the biographical frame-
work as an organizing principal. Although these authors carefully compare
and contrast the first ladies–and thus look across presidential administra-
tions–their unit of analysis remains the individual woman rather than the
position or office.
What we gain from the biographical approach is an appreciation for
the informal power of the first lady. Robert Watson (2000) carries this in-
sight to its logical conclusion, classifying first ladies according to their
performance of “eleven fundamental duties”: wife and mother; public
figure and celebrity; nation’s social hostess; symbol of the American
woman; White House manager and preservationist; campaigner; social
advocate and champion of social causes; presidential spokesperson; pres-
idential and political party booster; diplomat; political and presidential
partner (72). Though each of these has political content, few are readily
susceptible to legal codification. And, in actuality, Watson concludes that
“vague legal parameters” have been an important factor in the position’s
evolution (47). The first lady’s post is thus presented as almost exclu-
sively informal in nature.
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Yet, it would be more accurate to state that scholars have most often
examined the cultural institution of the “first ladyship” rather than the
formal position of the first lady. This latter analysis gained momentum in
1993, however, when three interest groups brought suit against First Lady
Hillary Rodham Clinton as chair of the President’s Task Force on Health
Care Reform. With an array of cabinet members and senior White House
staff members on the task force, and an interdepartmental working group
of more than 300 members, the task force conducted closed door meet-
ings to facilitate discussion and decision-making. Objecting to this prac-
tice were the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc.
(AAPS), representing medical doctors engaged in legal, sociological, and
public relations aspects of medicine; the American Council for Health
Care Reform, advocating on behalf of free market approaches to medical
care reform; and the National Legal and Policy Center. Seeking access to
the task force deliberations, these organizations filed for a temporary in-
junction and restraining order. They argued that the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA; PL 92-463) stipulated that meetings must be
open, with minutes provided to the public, when the membership of an
executive advisory body included other than full-time federal employees
or officials. The task force member who failed to satisfy this criterion was
its chair, the first lady. Suddenly the legal status of the first lady–and thus
the formal definition of this position–was a matter of immediate concern.
The Statutory Law
Three laws–the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967 (PL
90-206), the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1884 (31 USC 1342), and the White
House Personnel Authorization Act of 1978 (PL 95-570)–are relevant to
the first lady’s position (see Appendix A). At once complementary and
contradictory, these statutes provide only limited guidance in formally
defining, let alone constraining, the first lady as a member of the White
House Office.
Section 221 of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967 pro-
hibited nepotism in executive branch employment, appointments, and
promotions. In hearings, senators warned that this law would close all ex-
ecutive branch positions, including those in the military, to members of
the president’s family (Congressional Record 1967). Still, no exemptions
were suggested or adopted. So long as this law was in effect, a president’s
wife could not be appointed to or employed in an executive branch posi-
tion. Her actions would be limited to the informal duties and powers of
the first ladyship.
28 WOMEN & POLITICS
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Reinforcing this statute were laws governing the payment of federal
employees and officials. Violators of the anti-nepotism law were not enti-
tled to payment for their services (5 USC 3110(c)). Yet, the Anti-Defi-
ciency Act banned all voluntary governmental service, unless given to
save a life under emergency conditions (31 USC 1342). Thus, a first lady
could not be paid to work in the executive branch without violating two
strictures of the anti-nepotism act, and she could not volunteer without vio-
lating one stricture in the anti-nepotism law and also the Anti-Deficiency
Act (see also Krausert 1998). Under these circumstances, the sanctions
against the first ladies’ service in the executive branch seemed complete
and unequivocal. Not only was the first lady denied a formal post, but the
acceptability of her performing even the responsibilities associated with
the first ladyship was called into question.
The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice, how-
ever, uncovered possibilities where none were thought to exist. The OLC
concluded that there were “two conditions under which uncompensated
services may be accepted by the government even when no explicit statu-
tory authority exists [for their acceptance]: (1) when rendered ‘in an official
capacity under regular appointment to office’; and (2) when otherwise
permitted by law to be nonsalaried because there is no minimum required
salary” (Nolan 1992, 126). The first lady arguably was a legal volunteer
within the executive branch. Though she was not paid for doing so, she
performed a variety of duties on behalf of the president. For example, she
traveled throughout the world as a presidential representative, she deliv-
ered speeches and made public announcements, and she hosted organiza-
tions at the White House and conducted substantive policy meetings.
Proposals to salary the first lady having been soundly rejected by the pub-
lic, it seemed that the voluntary character of her political contributions
was accepted as the norm. Thus, the catch-22 of the anti-nepotism law
(relatives cannot be paid for their government service) and the anti-defi-
ciency law (volunteers cannot perform government service) had been
eliminated. The first step had been taken in protecting the informal power
of the first lady.
But what about the injunction imposed by the anti-nepotism law? The
1978 White House Personnel Authorization Act seemed to exempt the
first lady from this prohibition, as well. Section 105(e) of this act, titled
“Assistance and Services for the President,” related to the first lady.
(e) Assistance and services authorized pursuant to this section to the
President are authorized to be provided to the spouse of the Presi-
dent in connection with assistance provided by such spouse to the
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President in the discharge of the President’s duties and responsibili-
ties. If the President does not have a spouse, such assistance and ser-
vices may be provided for such purposes to a member of the
President’s family whom the President designates. (PL 95-570,
105(e))
Arguably, 105(e) formally identified the first lady as an assistant to the
president, as a senior member of the White House staff who presided over
other presidential aides. In support of this contention, there was the sub-
section’s acknowledgement that the spouse offered “assistance . . . in the
discharge of the President’s duties and responsibilities.” Additionally, the
first lady was being legislatively identified as an executive within a White
House unit. To this way of thinking, Section 105(e) established an office
of the first lady that was similar to the office of the vice president. Be-
cause she already held a formal office, the first lady could undertake other
responsibilities throughout the administration and the executive branch,
including those that involved receiving a presidential appointment (see
AAPS et al. v. Clinton Brief for the Appellants 1993; AAPS et al. v.
Clinton Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees and Cross-Appellants 1993; AAPS
et al. v. Clinton Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees and Cross Appellants
1993).
Alternatively, it was possible to argue that 105(e) did not even address
the formal position of the first lady. This law still defined the first lady in
terms of her spousal relationship to the president. Moreover, first ladies
were “designated” rather than appointed, a significant distinction since
the prohibitions of the anti-nepotism law related to federal officers and
employees who were appointed to or employed in their posts. These con-
siderations suggested that 105(e) circumvented, rather than overturned,
the anti-nepotism law. A 1977 OLC opinion stated that “Mrs. Carter
would not be regarded as a special Government employee solely on the
ground that she may discuss governmental matters with the President on
a daily basis” (Harmon 1977, 22). Nothing in 105(e), according to those
who favored this second interpretation, gave cause to revise this conclu-
sion (see Wasserman 1995). The first lady could apparently exercise in-
formal power through the first ladyship, but she was prohibited from
exercising formal power as a federal employee or officer in the executive
branch.
These debates about the first lady’s formal status and power did not
discourage modern presidents’ wives from becoming more deeply in-
volved in presidential policy-making processes. Their engagement did,
however, raise questions about the accountability and responsiveness of
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the first lady as a presidential advisor. This was the matter addressed by
the federal courts when ruling on the AAPS et al. v. Clinton (1993).
The Case Law
The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. (AAPS),
the American Council for Health Care Reform, and the National Legal
and Policy Center argued that the first lady’s status as a federal officer
had to be determined by reference to legal standards, not tradition. And
they maintained that law precluded the first lady from being a full-time
federal official. The United States Code (USC) stipulated that a federal
official had to be appointed to office, yet the first lady could claim no
such authorization under Section 105(e) and was prohibited from doing
so by the anti-nepotism law. Thus, she was a private citizen and the task
force meetings had to be open to the public (AAPS et al. v. Clinton Plain-
tiff’s Memorandum 1993; AAPS et al. v. Clinton Brief for Plaintiff-Ap-
pellees and Cross-Appellants 1993; AAPS et al. v. Clinton Reply Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellees and Cross-Appellants 1993).
The government, however, claimed that the first lady was the “func-
tional equivalent” of a full-time federal officer, citing congressional au-
thorizations of funding and staff for the president’s spouse to assist the
president. In the words of the government’s memorandum to the District
Court, “History, legislative enactments, and practical realities place this
First Lady and all First Ladies among the President’s closest advisors and
government ‘insiders’” (14-15). Section 105(e), therefore, buttressed ar-
guments for, as well as against, the first lady’s claim to be a federal offi-
cial (AAPS et al. v. Clinton Brief for the Appellants 1993; AAPS et al. v.
Clinton Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees and Cross-Appellants 1993; AAPS
et al. v. Clinton Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees and Cross-Appellants
1993).
The D.C. District Court concluded that the first lady failed to conform
to the legal definition of a federal official (AAPS et al. v. Clinton 1993a).
On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed that judgment
(AAPS et al. v. Clinton 1993b). The majority opinion identified the first
lady as a de facto federal official for the purposes of FACA, though it re-
fused to rule on the first lady’s status in relation to other statutes (AAPS et
al. v. Clinton 1993b).
A concurring opinion by Circuit Court Judge James L. Buckley sig-
naled that debates about the first lady’s legal status were far from over.
After carefully examining the law, Buckley concluded that the first lady
was neither a federal official nor a federal employee. Further, he wrote,
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the anti-nepotism law did apply to the president’s wife and 105(e) did not
establish an office of the first lady (AAPS et al. v. Clinton 1993b). If the
majority opinion offered a cautious endorsement of the first lady as a for-
mal member of the executive branch, Buckley’s opinion questioned
whether she could even be an informal participant in its workings.
This analysis of the statutory and case law related to the first lady begins
to suggest the problematic nature of this actor’s status within the executive
branch generally, and the presidency specifically. Still, the political and
policy implications of the law have yet to be considered. For this, we turn
to case studies of those instances in which first ladies have served as for-
mal advisors to the president. It is on these occasions that the law has
been most closely scrutinized. Likewise, it is in fulfilling this role that the
first lady has been subjected to the most searching review.
THE FIRST LADY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH:
FORMAL AND INFORMAL POWER IN PRACTICE
Statutory and case law have each made their contributions to the insti-
tutional development of this position and office within the White House.
Law has constrained the first lady’s ability to serve as a presidential advi-
sor, as seen in the anti-nepotism and anti-deficiency statutes. Law has
also enhanced the first lady’s capacity to contribute to presidential deci-
sion-making, as seen in the White House personnel authorization and the
AAPS et al. appellate ruling. Having acquired an appreciation for the
workings and complexities of formal power in this position and office,
we can begin to determine how formal and informal power have each
been exercised by the presidents’ wives.
Though a first lady arguably exercises formal and informal power
whenever she performs a political act, she does so most obviously when
serving as a presidential appointee. As an officeholder within an estab-
lished hierarchy, the president’s wife acquires a formal identity. Her super-
visors are formally established, as are the standards for her performance.
At the same time, informally, the first lady retains access to the chief ex-
ecutive, endures intense scrutiny, and confronts conflicting standards for
her behavior.
These tensions could be resolved by applying the anti-nepotism and
anti-deficiency statutes. The first lady could simply be prohibited from
formal executive branch service, even to the point of limiting the duties
that are presently and informally attributed to the first ladyship. The first
lady would become the president’s dependent, even his satellite; she
32 WOMEN & POLITICS
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
on
ne
cti
cu
t C
oll
eg
e] 
at 
07
:23
 07
 M
ay
 20
13
 
would be denied any professional benefits from her husband’s election to
presidential office. Such an outcome, however, would ignore her contri-
butions to his political success. According to Georgia Duerst-Lahti
(1997), the husband’s career accomplishments would be his alone; they
would not become the communal property of the marriage.
Alternatively, the first lady’s opportunities for service could be pro-
tected by relying on an expansive reading of the appellate ruling in AAPS
et al. v. Clinton. As an executive branch appointee, a first lady’s formal
service could be viewed as an extension of duties historically performed
by her predecessors. In the appellate opinion, a majority of justices dis-
missed distinctions between the office of the first lady and the first lady-
ship. If this could be extended to other legal contexts, it would be an
extraordinary grant of formal authority.
Political practice has fallen between these extremes. Just as first ladies
have been limited and empowered by the law, they have had lesser and
greater amounts of formal power. They have also been more and less able
to utilize their informal power. The following brief case studies examine
this dynamic of formal and informal power in each instance of a first
lady’s appointment to an executive branch position. The first ladies and
their appointments are Eleanor Roosevelt, Assistant Director of the Of-
fice of Civilian Defense (OCD); Rosalynn Carter, Honorary Chairman
[sic] of the President’s Commission on Mental Health; and Hillary
Rodham Clinton, Chair of the President’s Task Force on National Health
Reform.
The first ladies and their appointments span approximately fifty years
in the institutional development of the first lady’s position. As first lady,
Eleanor Roosevelt encountered no legal constraints on her appointment
to a position in the executive branch. Her experiences, therefore, provide
an indication of what might be required to formally ensure the first lady’s
accountability and responsiveness, given the extent of her informal power.
The Rosalynn Carter case strongly contrasts with that of Eleanor Roose-
velt, as the anti-nepotism act was narrowly interpreted when First Lady
Carter sought an appointment to her husband’s mental health commis-
sion. A study of Carter’s political activism as a formal advisor, therefore,
begins to indicate the extent to which a first lady’s discretion may be for-
mally constrained. In contrast to Roosevelt and Carter, Hillary Rodham
Clinton held office at a time when the position of the first lady seemed to
receive its most notable grant of formal power. Thus, these cases cumula-
tively reveal the intermixing of formal power and constraint with infor-
mal power and constraint, when first ladies are appointed to serve as
presidential advisors.
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Eleanor Roosevelt, Assistant Director of the Office
of Civilian Defense (September 1941-February 1942)
President Roosevelt established the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD)
in May 1941, the same month in which he declared an unlimited national
emergency. The agency was directed to recruit civilian defense volun-
teers, signaling the imminence of war to a still-isolationist population.
The agency’s part-time director was Fiorello La Guardia, then mayor of
New York City.
Throughout the war years, Eleanor Roosevelt upheld social reform
ideals that she considered the core of the New Deal programs. In 1941,
she believed that the OCD could give programmatic expression to those
values, preventing the war from eclipsing the New Deal’s advances. In-
stead, La Guardia focused on military preparedness, inventorying municipal
resources and enlisting air raid wardens and aircraft spotters. Frustrated, El-
eanor criticized the mayor, first in conversations with the president and
then in a press conference. Shortly thereafter, La Guardia offered her the
OCD assistant directorship (Beasley 1983, 247; Goodwin 1994, 280-281,
324-325; Gutin 1989, 90-91; Lash 1982, 355, 374; Roosevelt 1958, 230;
Roosevelt to Kerr 1942).
The appointment was discussed at one of the first lady’s press confer-
ences.
Question: How did you happen to take a public job?
Eleanor Roosevelt: Well, the mayor had asked the President and
seemed to feel that the time had come when everybody who could
do any work as a volunteer should do it. Therefore, I decided that as
I could do it as a volunteer, I had better do it. The mayor and the
President and me, both. The President has to approve anyone who is
going to be in a position.
Q: He asked the President not for permission to ask you but for per-
mission?
ER: Just as he would ask about anyone he was bringing in as an as-
sistant director. Whether I would be useful, I suppose. He may have
asked him also from the point of view of having any personal objec-
tions. I don’t know about that. (Beasley 1983, 224)
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Refusing to comment on her husband’s “personal” views, Eleanor Roo-
sevelt framed her OCD appointment as a personnel decision based on po-
litical and policy considerations. Doing so reflected the fact that the first
lady faced no distinctive legal constraints in being appointed to her hus-
band’s administration.
True to his invitation, La Guardia gave Eleanor the opportunity to act
on her ideas, so much so that she felt he abdicated his own responsibilities
as director (Roosevelt 1958, 225). To condense history, continuing con-
flicts between Eleanor and the mayor eventually led to his being replaced
by Harvard Law School Dean James Landis (Goodwin 1994, 324-325).
Meanwhile, the attack on Pearl Harbor shifted White House priorities in
favor of military preparedness (Roosevelt 1958, 230). An OCD authori-
zation provided congressional critics with an opportunity to disparage the
first lady’s personnel choices and programs (Congressional Record
1942; Lash 1982, 368-375). Initially determined to outlast the criticism,
Eleanor Roosevelt resigned as assistant director when she concluded that
her presence “would bring more harm than good to the program” (Roose-
velt to Kerr 1942).
This first case study demonstrates the complications that may result
from a first lady’s appointment to a position in her husband’s administra-
tion. A first lady’s access to the president is a formidable grant of infor-
mal power, enabling her to evade established bureaucratic hierarchies
and to pursue her own policy priorities. As much was seen in Eleanor’s
success in displacing OCD Director La Guardia. Yet, there are also pow-
erful informal checks on the first lady. As assistant director, Roosevelt’s
statements and actions were closely scrutinized. Congressional debate
about the OCD authorization, for example, veered into protracted tangen-
tial discussions about Assistant Director/First Lady Roosevelt’s pro-
grammatic and personnel decisions.
By any standard, Eleanor Roosevelt’s tenure as the OCD assistant di-
rector was a failure. Few of her programs were implemented and even
those were discontinued shortly after she left office. However insightful
her proposals, Roosevelt’s ability and willingness to end-run established
processes caused her to be viewed as more threatening than creative.
Though the federal anti-nepotism law is typically attributed to concerns
about Robert Kennedy’s service as attorney general, similar attitudes
were generated by Eleanor Roosevelt’s actions as OCD assistant director.
Rather than legitimizing presidential appointments for first ladies, she
raised serious questions about their wisdom and efficacy. It did not seem
that first ladies would be granted formal power so much as they would
find their informal power increasingly scrutinized.
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Rosalynn Carter, Honorary Chairman of the President’s Commission
on Mental Health (February 1977-April 1978)
Reflecting on the 1976 presidential campaign, Rosalynn Carter con-
cluded that she had made one promise in her own name, which was to
conduct a study of the nation’s mental health needs. The stigma associ-
ated with mental illness, coupled with funding cuts, had resulted in a frag-
mented and limited set of services. When the Carters entered the White
House in 1977, the last systematic assessment of national mental health
needs had been prepared in the Kennedy administration, over 15 years
earlier (Foley and Sharfstein 1983).
Rosalynn Carter described her learning about mental health as per-
sonal and political. As a child, she remembered, she was fearful of a dis-
tant cousin who was periodically treated at a state hospital, even though
he “probably wanted nothing more than friendship and recognition”
(Carter 1984). Then, throughout the Carter gubernatorial campaign, she
learned that many families were concerned about caring for their men-
tally ill. As first lady of Georgia, she was the principal force behind the es-
tablishment of a gubernatorial commission, and she subsequently
participated in its meetings and field research. Her commitment was re-
warded when many of the commission’s recommendations were imple-
mented (Carter 1984, 73, 94-95; Gutin 1989, 149).
In 1976, therefore, Rosalynn Carter spoke with a record of accom-
plishment in this policy area. But could she step from membership in a
governor’s commission to leadership of a presidential commission? To
ensure her success, Carter advisors throughout the presidential transition
briefed the first lady-elect on prospective administrative and political
problems. The appointment itself was seemingly a foregone conclusion
(Bourne to Carter 1976; Bryant to Huron 1977; Foley and Sharfstein
1983, 113). On the day the president issued the executive order establish-
ing the commission, however, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) con-
cluded that the federal anti-nepotism law prohibited the first lady from
formally participating on the commission (Kneedler to Harmon 1977, 1).
To accomplish the required detachment from the Commission’s Fed-
eral function, Mrs. Carter should at least have no formal authority or
duties relating to the Commission’s work and avoid being the mov-
ing force behind its operations–e.g., in selecting staff, convening
meetings, conducting hearings, establishing policy, or formulating
recommendations. This would not, however, prohibit Mrs. Carter
from attending meetings or hearings (although perhaps she should
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not do so on a regular basis), submitting her ideas to the Commis-
sion for consideration, or offering her support and soliciting support
from others for the Commission’s work. It is my understanding that
First Ladies have in the past assumed this type of advocate’s role in
connection with Government programs in which they were espe-
cially interested, and it would seem to make no difference here that
Mrs. Carter may have an honorary title that really only serves to
highlight her interest. (Kneedler to Harmon 1977, 15)
The phrasing of the OLC memorandum is highly significant. It endorses
a publicly visible role for the first lady–making specific reference to her
historic contributions as an “advocate”–while cautioning against a sub-
stantive role as a policy advisor. This is an unworkable distinction, given
the importance of public presentation in the modern presidency (see
Kernell 1997; Stuckey 1991). If it is ignorant of modern presidential
practices, however, the OLC opinion is conversant with the responsibili-
ties traditionally assigned to men and to their wives. It reserved politics
and politicking to the president, leaving the helpmate and decorative
functions to the first lady. If Rosalynn Carter merely issued moral pro-
nouncements, she would not call into question the prevailing gendered al-
location of power. If, however, she made substantive contributions to the
policy development process, the OLC concluded, she would be overturn-
ing tradition and breaking the law.
At the last minute, Dr. Thomas E. Bryant was appointed commission
chair and Rosalynn Carter was named “honorary chairman” (Public Pa-
pers 1977, 185-189). Though Bryant and the first lady had a constructive
and complementary working relationship, Rosalynn objected to her
“honorary” status (Public Papers 1980, 2100). Even in her memoirs, she
wrote, “[b]ecause of federal nepotism laws, I could not be appointed the
formal chairperson of the commission but had to settle for ‘honorary’ in-
stead” (Carter 1984, 272-279) (emphasis added). Carter perceived the
loss of the chairmanship as a loss of formal power for which she had
served a rigorous apprenticeship in state and electoral politics.
As honorary chairman, Carter disregarded the OLC guidelines. She
and the president selected the commissioners. She attended all but three
commission meetings. She convened and presided over all of the public
hearings (President’s Commission on Mental Health Files). She became
the primary advocate for the commission report, lobbying within the
White House and throughout the administration, as well as giving numer-
ous speeches and interviews (Onek and Elms to Eizenstat 1978; Gutin
1989, 151). She testified before the Senate Labor and Human Relations
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Committee on behalf of the Mental Health Systems Act and was univer-
sally recognized as having been “instrumental” to its passage (Congres-
sional Record 1979; Torrey 1988, 189-197). Thus, she successfully
leveraged her informal power and status against the formal constraints,
entering the executive and legislative policy-making processes and be-
coming a political actor in her own right.
Though Carter’s designation as honorary chairman ensured that she
had no “formal authority or duties,” the commission’s own transcripts
and documents indicate that she was most definitely “the moving force
behind its operations” (President’s Commission on Mental Health Files).
It remained to be seen, though, what effect Carter’s accomplishments
would have on the position of the first lady. Because she had been obliged
to renounce the formal power of a commission chair for the informal
power of the first ladyship, her policy contributions could be attributed to
her personal ambition. Under these circumstances, Carter’s success could
reinforce fears that a politically adroit first lady would choose to be nei-
ther accountable nor responsive to the public.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Chair of the President’s Task Force
on National Health Reform (January 1993-1994)
President Clinton named First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton as the un-
salaried chair of his Task Force on National Health Care Reform on Janu-
ary 25, 1993 (Public Papers 1993, 15). The president described Clinton
as qualified for this position because she had chaired education and health
reform committees at the state level, and had been a member of the
Southern Regional Task Force on Infant Mortality and the Arkansas
Children’s Hospital Board (Public Papers 1993, 13-16). Like Rosalynn
Carter, Hillary Rodham Clinton had credentials as a political and policy
advisor, which supported her claim to formal power.
The first lady would need to draw on that experience and expertise in
chairing the task force. Access to health care was an exceptionally com-
plex matter. Although Bill Clinton first commented on the issue during
the New Hampshire primary, a coherent proposal had never been devel-
oped. Still, polling revealed that a significant percentage of voters had
supported Bill Clinton in anticipation of health care reforms; the issue
even seemed a possible base for renewing the middle class Democratic
coalition. As a difficult policy problem with a high public profile, the
health care task force promised to be a significant political challenge.
Yet, there were further complications. Task force members included six
cabinet secretaries, the Office of Management and Budget director, and
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three of the most senior White House aides. An interdepartmental work-
ing group had more than 300 federal government employees. With so
many individuals of such different ranks, meetings and consultations
were cumbersome. Accordingly, closed door meetings were conducted
to facilitate discussions. In response, the Association of American Physi-
cians and Surgeons, Inc. (AAPS), the American Council for Health Care
Reform, and the National Legal and Policy Center filed suit, requesting
that the task force meetings and minutes be opened to the public (Drew
1994).
Litigation relating to the task force extended from 1993 into 1995, as
the interest groups challenged the task force’s compliance with the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act. These were not the only legal challenges
to confront the first lady as task force chair. When it became known that
Clinton held shares in a mutual fund which had profited from judicial
trading at the time of her congressional testimony, a group of legislators
became convinced that the first lady had violated criminal conflict of in-
terest laws. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) subsequently vindi-
cated Clinton. Yet, OGE’s ruling included the suggestion that the federal
conflict of interest laws might not even be applicable to the first lady.
Though the statutes obviously applied to de jure federal officials, the first
lady’s exceptional status was in need of further definition (AAPS et al. v.
Clinton 1993b; Hasson 1993, A4; Krausert 1998; Locy 1994; Wasserman
1995).
The policy process imposed further checks on Clinton. Although the
Congress did consider the task force report, with Clinton’s testimony in
committee hearings being praised for its substantive content, there were
no legislative enactments. Nor were there significant budgetary or pro-
grammatic reforms. The possibility of a new middle class coalition based
on health care reform was never realized. Likewise, the potential for a
formally strengthened position for the first lady evaporated. Even though
public opinion polls indicated that a majority of the public did not attrib-
ute the task force failure to Clinton’s leadership, she publicly retreated
from her role as a formal presidential advisor (Burrell 1997b; Guy 1995).
Not until she declared herself a candidate for the U.S. Senate did Hillary
Rodham Clinton again lay claim to formal political power. Instead, she
performed duties associated with the first ladyship, her public statements
focusing on such “women’s issues” as social programs and human rights.
Though she was a force within the Clinton White House, Hillary Rodham
Clinton, nonetheless, relied on her informal rather than her formal power
for most of her husband’s eight years in the Oval Office. This first lady’s
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formal power was checked by both the formal processes of policy making
and the informal dictates of public opinion.
DISCUSSION
An informal institution for much of its history, the first lady’s position
has recently been defined through statutory and case law. This apparent
innovation, however, evidences a striking continuity with past practices:
Both the formal descriptions and the informal expectations of the first
lady follow from her relationship to the president. Thus, the first lady has
found her opportunities for service in the wider executive branch con-
strained by the federal anti-nepotism statute. And yet, the first lady has
been granted resources so that she, as the “president’s spouse,” could as-
sist the chief executive. Biographical analyses of the first ladies indicate
that this assistance has historically been rendered through traditionally
feminine roles such as those of wife and mother, and nation’s hostess and
social advocate (Watson 2000). In the past, first ladies have served as
presidential advisors because they were wives, not because they were
presidential appointees.
This circumstance clarifies why AAPS et al. v. Clinton marks an im-
portant stage in the institutional development of the first lady’s position
and office. In this case, for the first time, the first lady is formally identi-
fied as a political actor in her own right. In addition to acknowledging the
first lady’s historic contributions to the presidency, the majority opinion
identified this individual as a de facto federal official for the purposes of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The first lady, then, was a legiti-
mate and formally defined post and office within the White House. No
longer can the political activism of the president’s wife be dismissed as
the expression of one woman’s ambition.
Still, this court ruling does not resolve all of the tensions or difficulties
associated with the first lady’s service as a presidential appointee. Most
notably, it does nothing to control or correct the potential for the first
lady’s abuse of her informal power. Every presidential advisor gains power
through her or his relationship with the chief executive. It is on the basis of
that relationship, after all, that an advisor’s claims to power become credible.
Yet, presidential “cronies”–and one must include the president’s wife among
his friends and intimates–may damage an administration even as they osten-
sibly work for its success. Their close relationship with the chief executive
may allow them to evade established routines for “staffing out” propos-
als. Time and again, this disregard for process has generated scandals that
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have profoundly disrupted presidential administrations. Elements of
these practices were seen in the Eleanor Roosevelt case study above. In
that instance, an agency director was essentially fired because he did not
implement the first lady’s priorities, even though his actions were con-
gruent with presidential priorities.
Moreover, the AAPS majority opinion does impose qualifications in its
grant of power to the first lady. It states only that the first lady is a de facto
federal official for the purposes of FACA. The broader legal implications
of her de facto, as opposed to de jure, status have yet to be determined.
The applicability of federal criminal conflict of interest statutes, the ex-
tent to which the first lady is protected by executive privilege, even her
susceptibility to civil suit as a policy advisor have yet to be established
(Broyde and Schapiro 1988, 501-502; Hasson 1993, A4; In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 1997; Krausert 1998; Patel 1998; Quinn,
Connaughton, and Rozell 1998, 23; Wasserman 1995). During the
Clinton administration, as noted in the case study, this ambiguity left the
first lady vulnerable to litigation. That, in turn, may have contributed to
Clinton’s subsequently less public and less formal role as a presidential
advisor: Repeated challenges to her formal power led to a reliance on in-
formal power.
The position and office of the first lady, therefore, are best understood
as being at an important and difficult stage in their development. The for-
mal authorization of the first lady’s political activism can be viewed as
empowering an already threatening figure in the White House Office–a
view that is held by many executive branch observers. Alternatively, the
formal legitimization of the first lady as a presidential advisor may open the
president’s wife to new charges of malfeasance–a conclusion that could be
ascribed to many of the first ladies. Meanwhile, Justice Buckley’s concur-
ring opinion adds to the uncertainty, by offering grounds for overturning
the appellate ruling.
Under these circumstances, it is important to note that there are strin-
gent checks on the formal and informal power of the first ladies. In each
of the case studies above, the first ladies’ initiatives encountered signifi-
cant challenges in Congress. If a first lady’s informal power permits her
to circumvent process within the White House, it does not seem that the
separation of powers allows her to do so in the larger political system.
The polity, therefore, may sometimes feel threatened by the first lady, but
its governmental institutions are in no danger.
If the polity can withstand the tensions accompanying the institutional
development of this position and office, can the first ladies? Perhaps not.
The problematic nature of the first lady’s formal power may encourage
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presidents’ wives to be less public–and less formal–in their politicking
(Fraser 1983, 1989). Enduring stereotypes of political wives also recom-
mend such a strategy. The presidential mythology still resonates with the
values of autonomy and individuality, strength and decisiveness. Sugges-
tions that the chief executive is anything else are resisted and even
scorned (Duerst-Lahti 1997; see also Butler 1990). At the same time, the
sexual intimacy of marriage generates its own mythology of a woman’s
ability to seduce and dominate her mate (Jamieson 1995). On the one
hand, then, the president is expected to be independent of his advisors; on
the other, he is presumed to be susceptible to the first lady’s scheming. It
is in the national interest, then, to control (and even marginalize) the first
lady. In an effort to avoid this outcome, first ladies may resort to being
purely informal presidential advisors. If so, they will vindicate the auton-
omy of the presidents by stripping themselves of their opportunities.
Yet, if they choose this political strategy–and make the associated pro-
fessional sacrifices–the first ladies will set a destructive example for the
public and for other presidential advisors. In ceding their careers to their
husbands, they will endorse inequality and encourage political alienation.
In avoiding popular scrutiny, they will negate democratic ideals of ac-
countability and responsiveness. Because they hold a position that is cul-
tural and political, informal and formal, the choices of the presidents’
wives profoundly affect the legitimacy and the institutional capacity of
the presidency. Accordingly, the mixture of formal and informal power
in the first lady’s position is necessarily a matter for continuing study.
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APPENDIX A.
DETERMINING THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE FIRST LADY:
APPLICABLE STATUTES
POSTAL REVENUE AND FEDERAL SALARY ACT (1967)
Section 221 of this act is the federal anti-nepotism law. It declares that
a “public official may not appoint, employ, advance, or advocate for ap-
pointment, employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a civilian
position in the agency in which he is serving or over which he exercises
jurisdiction or control any individual who is a relative of the public offi-
cial.” Individuals appointed in violation of this law are not entitled to pay-
ment for their services. This law apparently prohibits the first lady from
serving in any executive branch position, given her husband’s supervi-
sory status as chief executive.
THE ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT (1884)
The anti-deficiency act was passed to control agency employment
practices and thus to safeguard the congressional power of the purse.
The anti-deficiency act was amended on several occasions and ulti-
mately banned all voluntary service to the government, unless given to
save a life under emergency conditions.
WHITE HOUSE PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATION ACT (1978)
Passed during the Carter presidency, this law authorizes the White
House staff. Section 105(e) authorizes the appointment of staff to aid the
president’s “spouse” in providing support to the president. An unmarried
president may “designate” a family member to serve in this role and thus
to receive the resources.
MaryAnne Borrelli 45
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
on
ne
cti
cu
t C
oll
eg
e] 
at 
07
:23
 07
 M
ay
 20
13
 
